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Abstract
The reliability of most deep learning algorithms is fundamentally challenged by the
existence of adversarial examples, which are incorrectly classified inputs that are
extremely close to a correctly classified input. We study adversarial examples for
deep neural networks with random weights and biases and prove that the `1 distance
of any given input from the classification boundary scales at least as
√
n, where n
is the dimension of the input. We also extend our proof to cover all the `p norms.
Our results constitute a fundamental advance in the study of adversarial examples,
and encompass a wide variety of architectures, which include any combination
of convolutional or fully connected layers with skipped connections and pooling.
We validate our results with experiments on both random deep neural networks
and deep neural networks trained on the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. Given the
results of our experiments on MNIST and CIFAR10, we conjecture that the proof
of our adversarial robustness guarantee can be extended to trained deep neural
networks. This extension will open the way to a thorough theoretical study of
neural network robustness by classifying the relation between network architecture
and adversarial distance.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks constitute an extremely powerful architecture for machine learning and have
achieved an enormous success in several fields such as speech recognition, computer vision and
natural language processing where they can often outperform human abilities [1–5]. In 2014, a very
surprising property of deep neural networks emerged in the context of image classification [6]: an
extremely small perturbation can change the label of a correctly classified image. This property is
particularly concerning since it may be exploited by a malicious adversary to fool a machine learning
algorithm by steering its output. For this reason, methods to find perturbed inputs or adversarial
examples have been named adversarial attacks. This problem further captured the attention of the
deep learning community when it was discovered that real-world images taken with a camera can also
constitute adversarial examples [7–10]. To study adversarial attacks, two lines of research have been
developed: one aims to develop efficient algorithms to find adversarial examples [11–13], and the
other aims to make deep neural networks more robust against adversarial attacks [14–18]; algorithms
to compute the robustness of a given trained deep neural network against adversarial attacks have
also been developed [19, 20].
Several theories have been proposed to explain the phenomenon of adversarial examples [21–31].
One of the most prominent theories states that adversarial examples are an unavoidable feature of the
high-dimensional geometry of the input space: Refs. [32–35] show that, if the classification error is
finite, the classification of a correctly classified input can be changed with an adversarial perturbation
of relative size O (1 /
√
n ), where n is the dimension of the input space.
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In this paper, we study the properties of adversarial examples for wide, deep neural networks with
random weights and biases. Our main result, presented in section 3, is a probabilistic robustness
guarantee on the `1 distance (later extended to all the `p distances)1 of a given input from the closest
classification boundary. We prove that the `1 distance from the closest classification boundary of any
given x ∈ Rn whose entries are O(1) is with high probability at least Ω˜ (√n) (the tilde means that
logarithmic factors are hidden), i.e., the distance from x of any adversarial example is larger than
Ω˜ (
√
n). Since ‖x‖1 = Θ(n), our result implies that the relative size of any adversarial perturbation is
at least Ω˜ (1 /
√
n ). This lower bound to the size of adversarial perturbations matches the upper bound
imposed by the high-dimensional geometry proven in Refs. [32–35]. Therefore, our result proves that
1 /
√
n is the universal scaling of the minimum size of adversarial perturbations. We also prove that,
for any given unit vector v ∈ Rn, with high probability all the inputs x+ t v with 0 ≤ t ≤ O (√n)
have the same classification as x. Since ‖x‖2 = Θ (
√
n), a remarkable consequence of this result
is that a finite fraction of the `2 distance to the origin can be traveled without encountering any
classification boundary.
Our results encompass a wide variety of network architectures, namely any combination of convo-
lutional or fully connected layers with nonlinear activation, skipped connections and pooling (see
section 2).
Our proof builds on the equivalence between deep neural networks with random weights and biases
and Gaussian processes [36, 37]. We prove that the same probabilistic robustness guarantees for the
adversarial distance also apply to a broad class of Gaussian processes when the variance is lower
bounded by the Euclidean square norm of the input and the feature map of the kernel associated to
the Gaussian process is Lipshitz, a result that can be of independent interest.
In section 4 we experimentally validate our theoretically predicted scaling of the adversarial distance
for random deep neural networks. In subsection 4.1 we experimentally study the adversarial distance
for deep neural networks trained on the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. In both cases, the training
does not change the order of magnitude of the adversarial distance. While for MNIST the adversarial
distances for random and trained networks are very close, in the case of CIFAR10 the training
decreases the adversarial distance by roughly half order of magnitude. As better discussed in
subsection 4.1, this can be ascribed to the different nature of the CIFAR10 with respect to the MNIST
data.
The results of our experiments make us conjecture that the proof of our adversarial robustness
guarantees can be extended to trained deep neural networks. This extension will open the way to the
first thorough theoretical study of the relationship between the network architecture and its robustness
to adversarial attacks, thus leading to understand which changes in the architecture lead to the best
improvements.
1.1 Related works
The equivalence between neural networks with random weights and Gaussian processes in the limit
of infinite width has been known for a long time in the case of fully connected neural networks
with one hidden layer [38, 39], but it has only recently been extended to multi-layer [36, 40, 40–43]
and convolutional deep neural networks [44–46]. The equivalence is now proved for practically
all the existing neural networks architectures [37], and has been extended to trained deep neural
networks [47–54] including adversarial training [55].
Robustness guarantees for Bayesian inference with Gaussian processes were first considered in [56].
The smoothness of the feature map of a kernel plays a key role in machine learning applications
[57–60] and kernels associated to deep neural networks have been studied from this point of view [61].
In the setup of binary classification of bit strings, the Hamming distance of a given input from the clos-
est classification boundary has been theoretically studied in [62], where the scaling O
(√
n /lnn
)
has been found.
1the `p norm of a vector x ∈ Rn is ‖x‖p =
(∑n
i=1 |xi|p
) 1
p
2
2 Setup
Our inputs areD-dimensional images considered as elements of Rn
(0)
C ×I(0) , where n(0)C is the number
of the input channels (e.g., n(0)C = 3 for Red-Green-Blue images) and I(0) = Zh1 × . . . × ZhD
is the set of the input pixels, assumed for simplicity to be periodic. D = 2 recovers standard 2D
images. For the sake of a simpler notation, we will sometimes consider the input space as Rn, with
n = n
(0)
C
∣∣I(0)∣∣.
Our architecture allows for any combination of convolutional layers, fully connected layers, skipped
connections and pooling. For the sake of a simpler notation, we treat each of the above operations
as a layer, even if it does not include any nonlinear activation. For simplicity, we assume that the
nonlinear activation function is the ReLU τ(x) = max(0, x). Our results can be easily extended to
other activation functions.
For any l = 1, . . . , L+ 1 and any input x ∈ Rn(0)C ×I(0) , let n(l)C be the number of channels and I(l)
the set of pixels of the output of the l-th layer φ(l)(x) ∈ Rn(l)C ×I(l) . The layer transformations have
the following mathematical expression:
• Input layer: We have I(1) = I(0) and
φ
(1)
i,α(x) = b
(1)
i +
n
(0)
C∑
j=1
∑
β∈P(1)
W
(1)
ij,β xj,α+β , i = 1, . . . , n
(1)
C , α ∈ I(1) , (1)
where P(1) ⊆ I(1) = I(0) is the convolutional patch of the first layer. We assume for
simplicity that −P(1) = P(1).
• Nonlinear layer: If the (l + 1)-th layer is a nonlinear layer, we have I(l+1) = I(l) and
φ
(l+1)
i,α (x) = b
(l+1)
i +
n
(l)
C∑
j=1
∑
β∈P(l+1)
W
(l+1)
ij,β τ
(
φ
(l)
j,α−β(x)
)
,
i = 1, . . . , n
(l+1)
C ,
α ∈ I(l+1) , (2)
where τ : R→ R is the activation function and P(l+1) ⊆ I(l+1) = I(l) is the convolutional
patch of the layer. We assume for simplicity that −P(l+1) = P(l+1). Fully connected layers
are recovered by
∣∣I(l)∣∣ = ∣∣I(l+1)∣∣ = ∣∣P(l+1)∣∣ = 1.
• Skipped connection: If the (l+ 1)-th layer is a skipped connection, we have n(l+1)C = n
(l)
C ,
I(l+1) = I(l) and
φ
(l+1)
i,α (x) = φ
(l)
i,α(x) + φ
(l−k)
i,α (x) , i = 1, . . . , n
(l+1)
C , α ∈ I(l+1) , (3)
where k ∈ {1, . . . , l − 2} is such that the sum in (3) is well defined, i.e., n(l−k)C = n(l)C
and I(l−k) = I(l). For the sake of a simple proof, we assume that the l-th layer is either a
convolutional or a fully connected layer.
• Pooling: If the (l + 1)-th layer is a pooling layer, we have n(l+1)C = n
(l)
C , and I(l+1) is a
partition of I(l), i.e., the elements of I(l+1) are disjoint subsets of I(l) whose union is equal
to I(l). We assume by simplicity that the l-th layer is a convolutional layer and that all the
elements of I(l+1) have the same cardinality, which is therefore equal to ∣∣I(l)∣∣/ ∣∣I(l+1)∣∣.
We have
φ
(l+1)
i,α (x) =
∑
β∈α
φ
(l)
i,β(x) , i = 1, . . . , n
(l+1)
C , α ∈ I(l+1) . (4)
• Flattening layer: Let the (Lf + 1)-th layer be the flattening layer. We notice that we
include a fully connected layer directly after the flattening as part of this layer. We have∣∣I(Lf+1)∣∣ = 1 and
φ
(Lf+1)
i (x) = bi +
n
(Lf )
C∑
j=1
∑
α∈I(Lf )
W
(Lf+1)
ij,α τ
(
φ(Lf )(x)
)
, i = 1, . . . , n
(Lf+1)
C . (5)
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• Output layer: The final output of the network is φ(x) = φ(L+1)1 (x), and the output label is
signφ(x). We introduce the other components of φ(L+1) for the sake of a simpler notation
in the proof of Theorem 2.
Our random deep neural networks draw all the weights W (l)ij,α and the biases b
(l)
i from independent
Gaussian probability distributions with zero mean and variances σ(l)W
2/
n
(l−1)
C and σ
(l)
b
2
, respectively.
We stress that the variances are allowed to depend on the layer.
3 Theoretical results
A recent series of works [36, 37, 40–46] has proved that in the limit n(1)C , . . . , n
(L+1)
C → ∞ the
random deep neural networks defined in section 2 are centered Gaussian processes, i.e., for any
M ∈ N and any set of M inputs x1, . . . , xM ∈ Rn(0)C ×I(0) , the joint probability distribution of
the corresponding outputs φ
(
x1
)
, . . . , φ
(
xM
) ∈ R is Gaussian with zero mean and covariance
given by a kernel K(x, y) = E(φ(x)φ(y)) that depends on the architecture of the deep neural
network. Therefore, studying adversarial perturbations for random deep neural networks is equivalent
to studying adversarial perturbations for the corresponding Gaussian processes. We will first prove in
Theorem 1 our adversarial robustness guarantee for a broad class of Gaussian processes. Then, we
will prove in Theorem 2 that the Gaussian processes corresponding to random deep neural networks
fall in the broad class. Thanks to the equivalence, this will prove that the guarantee applies to random
deep neural networks.
We recall that to any kernel K on Rn we can associate a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS)
H with scalar product and norm denoted by · and ‖·‖, respectively, and a feature map Φ : Rn → H
such that for any x, y ∈ Rn [63]
K(x, y) = Φ(x) · Φ(y) . (6)
A key role will be played by the RKHS distance
d(x, y)
2
= ‖Φ(x)− Φ(y)‖2 = K(x, x)− 2K(x, y) +K(y, y) . (7)
We can now state our main result, which we prove in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 (`1 adversarial robustness guarantee for Gaussian processes). Let φ be a Gaussian
process on Rn with zero mean and covariance K, and let d be the associated RKHS distance. Let
C, M > 0 be such that for any x, y ∈ Rn√
K(x, x) ≥ C ‖x‖2 , d(x, y) ≤M C ‖x− y‖2 . (8)
Let x0 ∈ Rn, and for any r > 0 let B1r = {x ∈ Rn : ‖x− x0‖1 < r} be the `1 ball with center x0
and radius r. Then, for any 0 < δ < 1 and any
0 < r ≤ ‖x0‖2 δ
√
pi
M
(
12
√
ln 4n+ 8 lnn
√
ln 2n+ 2
√
pi
) (9)
we have P
(∃x ∈ B1r : φ(x) = 0) ≤ δ.
Moreover, let v be a unit vector in Rn, and for any r > 0 let Lr = {x0 + t v : 0 ≤ t ≤ r} be the
segment starting in x0, parallel to v and with length r. Then, for any
0 < r ≤ pi ‖x0‖2 δ
2M + pi
(10)
we have P (∃x ∈ Lr : φ(x) = 0) ≤ δ.
Remark 1. Recalling that our classifier is signφ(x), we have φ(x) = 0 for some x in B1r iff B1r is
crossed by a classification boundary, i.e., iff there exists x ∈ B1r such that φ(x)φ(x0) < 0.
Remark 2. We do not have any reason to believe that the prefactor in (9) is sharp. Indeed, the
proof of Theorem 1 relies on Dudley’s theorem (Theorem 4), which provides an upper bound to the
expectation value of the maximum of a Gaussian process over a given region, and on an estimate
of the covering number of the `1 unit ball (Theorem 6). Despite employing the best state-of-the-art
tools, the prefactors of both these results are not sharp [64, 65].
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The following theorem, which we prove in Appendix B, states that the kernels of the Gaussian
processes that correspond to random deep neural networks satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (smoothness of the DNN Gaussian processes). Let K be the kernel associated to the
output of a random deep neural network as in section 2. Then, K satisfies (8) with
M =
√ ∣∣I(0)∣∣∣∣I(Lf )∣∣ , (11)
where we recall from section 2 that I(0) and I(Lf ) are sets of the pixels of the input and of the layer
immediately before the flattening, respectively.
Corollary 1 (`1 adversarial robustness guarantee for random deep neural networks). Let φ be
a random deep neural network as in section 2. Let x0 ∈ Rn
(0)
C ×I(0) , and for any r > 0 let
B1r =
{
x ∈ Rn(0)C ×I(0) : ‖x− x0‖1 < r
}
. Then, in the limit n(1)C , . . . , n
(L+1)
C → ∞, for any
0 < δ < 1 and any
0 < r ≤
√∣∣I(Lf )∣∣∣∣I(0)∣∣ ‖x0‖2 δ
√
pi
12
√
ln 4n+ 8 lnn
√
ln 2n+ 2
√
pi
, n = n
(0)
C
∣∣∣I(0)∣∣∣ (12)
we have P
(∃x ∈ B1r : φ(x) = 0) ≤ δ.
Moreover, let v be a unit vector in Rn
(0)
C ×I(0) , and for any r > 0 let Lr = {x0 + t v : 0 ≤ t ≤ r}.
Then, for any
0 < r ≤ pi ‖x0‖2 δ
2
√
|I(0)|
|I(Lf )| + pi
(13)
we have P {∃x ∈ Lr : φ(x) = 0} ≤ δ.
Remark 3 (asymptotic scaling). We stress that Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 hold for any choice of n,
n
(0)
C and I(0). In the limit n→∞, if all the entries of x0 are O(1) we have ‖x0‖2 = Θ (
√
n), and
therefore both (9) and (10) become, up to logarithmic factors,
0 < r ≤ O˜
(
δ
√
n
M
)
. (14)
Analogously, in the limit n = n(0)C
∣∣I(0)∣∣→∞ both (12) and (13) become
0 < r ≤ O˜
(
δ
√
n
√∣∣I(Lf )∣∣∣∣I(0)∣∣
)
. (15)
Remark 4 (`p adversarial robustness guarantees). For any p ≥ 1, the `p norm of a vector x ∈ Rn is
‖x‖p = (
∑n
i=1 |xi|p)
1
p . For any r > 0, let Bpr =
{
x ∈ Rn(0)C ×I(0) : ‖x− x0‖p < r
}
be the `p ball
with center x0 and radius r. Since ‖x− x0‖1 ≤ n
p−1
p ‖x− x0‖p for any x ∈ Rn
(0)
C ×I(0) , we trivially
have from Remark 3 that in the limit n→∞, P (∃x ∈ T pr : φ(x) = 0) ≤ δ for
0 < r ≤ O˜
(
δ n
2−p
2p
√∣∣I(Lf )∣∣∣∣I(0)∣∣
)
. (16)
In particular, the `2 and `∞ distances from the closest classification boundary scale at least as
Ω˜
(
δ
√
|I(Lf )|
|I(0)|
)
and Ω˜
(
δ√
n
√
|I(Lf )|
|I(0)|
)
, respectively.
To summarize, we have proven that the `1 distance of any given input from the closest classification
boundary is with high probability at least Ω(
√
n), where n is the dimension of the input. This result
applies both to deep neural networks with almost any architecture and random weights and biases,
and to smooth Gaussian processes.
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4 Experiments
To experimentally validate Corollary 1 and Remark 3, we performed adversarial attacks on random
inputs for various network architectures with randomly chosen weights. Experimental findings
were consistent across a variety of networks as shown in Appendix E, but for sake of brevity, we
only provide figures and results for a simplified residual network in this section. Figure 1 plots the
median distance of adversarial examples for a residual network similar to the first proposed residual
network [66]. This network contains three residual blocks and does not contain a global average
pooling layer before the final output (its complete architecture is given in subsection D.2). Attacks
were performed on 2-dimensional images with three channels and pixel values chosen randomly from
the standard uniform distribution.
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Figure 1: Random untrained networks: Median distance of closest adversarial examples ‖∆x‖p
from their respective inputs (p ∈ {1, 2, ∞}) scale as predicted in Remark 3 for a residual network
(see subsection D.2 for full description of network). Error bars span from the 45th percentile to the
55th percentile of adversarial distances. For each input dimension, results are calculated from 2000
samples (200 random networks each attacked at 10 random points). See Appendix D for further
details on how experiments were performed.
Results from Figure 1 plotting median adversarial distances as a function of the input dimension are
consistent with the expected theoretical scaling in Remark 3. Namely, adversarial distances in the `1,
`2, and `∞ norms scale with the dimension of the input n proportionally to
√
n, a constant C (not
dependent on n), and 1/
√
n respectively (up to logarithmic factors). Adversarial distances relative to
the average starting norm of an input are plotted in Figure 2. This adjusted metric named relative
distance provides a convenient means of understanding the scaling of adversarial distances, since
relative adversarial distances scale proportionally to 1/
√
n in all norms.
4.1 Adversarial Attacks on Trained Neural Networks
Results from section 4 indicate that adversarial attacks on networks with randomly chosen weights
empirically conform with our main findings presented in section 3. In this section, we extend our
experimental analysis to networks trained on MNIST and CIFAR10 data. We trained networks with
the same residual network architecture given in the prior section on MNIST and CIFAR10 data under
the task of binary classification. Networks were trained for 15 and 25 epochs for the MNIST and
CIFAR10 datasets respectively achieving greater than 98% training set accuracy in all cases. Refer to
subsection D.3 for full details on the training of the networks.
Properties of trained neural networks, especially as they relate to adversarial robustness and gener-
alization, are dependent on the properties of the data used to train them. For example, since neural
networks can be trained to “memorize” data [67], Corollary 1 can be forced to fail if the network
is trained on a dataset which contains very close inputs with different labels. From Figure 3, the
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Figure 2: Random untrained networks: Median relative distance of closest adversarial examples
‖∆x‖p/‖x0‖p from their respective inputs (p ∈ {1, 2, ∞}) scale with the input dimension n as
O(1/
√
n) in all norms for a residual network with random weights (see subsection D.2 for full
description of network). Results plotted here are for residual networks with random weights. Error
bars span from the 45th percentile to the 55th percentile of adversarial distances. For each input
dimension, results are calculated from 2000 samples (200 random networks each attacked at 10
random points).
networks trained on CIFAR10 data show a smaller adversarial distance with respect to random
networks both on random images and on images taken from the training or test set. In the case of
MNIST, training decreases the adversarial distance for random images, but does not significantly
change it for training or test images. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is the conspicuous
geometric and visual structure inherent in the MNIST dataset relative to CIFAR10. Digits in MNIST
all have the same uniform black background and geometry and roughly fill the whole image, while in
CIFAR10 the background and the relative size of the relevant part of the image can vary significantly,
and pictures are taken from various different angles (e.g., different orientations of a dog or car).
Thus, when trained on MNIST, networks can more easily embed training and test points within areas
far from classification boundaries. More generally, networks trained on MNIST data achieve low
generalization error and increased adversarial distances are correlated with those lower errors.
From Corollary 1, we expect the portion of images that have at least one adversarial example within a
given `1 distance to increase linearly with the distance. This finding is validated by results shown in
Figure 4 which plots the adversarial distance by percentile (sorted smallest to largest distance). In the
case of random images, the linear increase in adversarial distance by percentile is evident throughout
most of the percentiles in the chart conforming closely to the linear fit (dotted line). Interestingly,
this linear correlation is even observed in images in the training and test sets outside of the smallest
and highest percentiles. For training and test set images, networks usually predicted labels with high
confidence thus limiting the percentage of images falling at small distances from a classification
boundary.
5 Discussion
We have studied the properties of adversarial examples for deep neural networks with random weights
and biases and have proved that the `1 distance from the closest classification boundary of any given
input is with high probability at least Ω˜ (
√
n), where n is the dimension of the input (Corollary 1).
Since this lower bound matches the upper bound of [32–35], our result determines the universal
scaling of the minimum size of adversarial perturbations. We have validated our theoretical results
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Figure 3: Random vs trained networks: Median distance of adversarial examples (in `1 norm) for
random neural networks and neural networks of same architecture trained on MNIST and CIFAR10
data Figure 1. Analysis is performed for random images (images with randomly chosen pixel values)
and images in the training and test sets. Network architecture is a simplified residual network (see
subsection D.2).
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Figure 4: Trained networks: Adversarial distance by percentile for random images (images with
randomly chosen pixel values) and images in the training and test sets. The expected linear relationship
between distance and percentile is observed for random images apart from the highest percentiles as
is evident from the linear fit over percentiles ranging from 0 to 0.25 shown as dotted line. Adversarial
attacks are performed on the `1 norm. Network architecture is a simplified residual network (see
subsection D.2).
with experiments on both random deep neural networks and deep neural networks trained on the
MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. The experiments on random networks are completely in agreement
with our theoretical predictions. Networks trained on MNIST and CIFAR10 data are mostly consistent
with our main findings; therefore, we conjecture that the proof of our adversarial robustness guarantee
can be extended to trained deep neural networks. Such extension will be the focus of our future
research, which could e.g. exploit the equivalence between trained deep neural networks and Gaussian
processes [47–54]. This result will open the way to a more thorough theoretical study of the relation
between network architecture and adversarial phenomena, leading to understand which changes in the
architecture achieve the best improvements for the adversarial robustness. Moreover, our methods can
be employed to study the robustness of deep neural networks with respect to adversarial perturbations
that keep the data manifold invariant, such as smooth deformations of the input image [57–61].
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A Proof of Theorem 1
A.1 `1 adversarial distance
Let
pr = P
(∃x ∈ B1r : φ(x) = 0) , (17)
and for any φ0 > 0 let
pr(φ0) = P
(∃x ∈ B1r : φ(x) = 0 |φ(x0) = φ0) . (18)
Conditioning on φ(x0) = φ0, φ becomes the Gaussian process with average
µ(x) =
K(x, x0)φ0
K(x0, x0)
(19)
and covariance
Kˆ(x, y) = K(x, y)− K(x, x0)K(x0, y)
K(x0, x0)
. (20)
We put for any x ∈ Rn
φ(x) = µ(x)− ϕ(x) , (21)
such that ϕ is a centered Gaussian process with covariance Kˆ. Let
Kr = inf
x∈B1r
K(x, x0)
K(x0, x0)
, ϕr = E sup
x∈B1r
ϕ(x) , σ2r = sup
x∈B1r
Kˆ(x, x) , (22)
and let us assume that Kr φ0 > ϕr. The following theorem provides an upper bound to pr(φ0):
Theorem 3 (Borell–TIS inequality [68]). Let ϕ be a centered Gaussian process on Ω ⊂ Rn, and let
Kˆ be the associated kernel. Then, for any t > 0
P
(
sup
x∈Ω
ϕ(x) ≥ E sup
x∈Ω
ϕ(x) + t
)
≤ exp
(
− t
2
2σ2
)
, (23)
where
σ2 = sup
x∈Ω
Kˆ(x, x) . (24)
We have from Theorem 3
pr(φ0) ≤ P
(∃x ∈ B1r : ϕ(x) ≥ µ(x)) ≤ P (∃x ∈ B1r : ϕ(x) ≥ Kr φ0)
≤ exp
(
− (Kr φ0 − ϕr)
2
2σ2r
)
. (25)
Recalling that φ(x0) is a centered Gaussian random variable with variance K(x0, x0), we have
pr = 2
∫ ∞
0
pr(φ0) exp
(
− φ
2
0
2K(x0, x0)
)
dφ0√
2piK(x0, x0)
≤ 2
∫ ϕr
Kr
0
exp
(
− φ
2
0
2K(x0, x0)
)
dφ0√
2piK(x0, x0)
+ 2
∫ ∞
ϕr
Kr
exp
(
− (Kr φ0 − ϕr)
2
2σ2r
− φ
2
0
2K(x0, x0)
)
dφ0√
2piK(x0, x0)
≤
√
2
pi ϕr + σr
Kr
√
K(x0, x0)
. (26)
We get an upper bound on ϕr from the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Dudley’s theorem [69]). Let ϕ be a centered Gaussian process on Ω ⊂ Rn, and let dˆ be
the RKHS distance of the associated kernel. For any  > 0, let N() be the minimum number of balls
of dˆ with radius  that can cover Ω. Then,
E sup
x∈Ω
ϕ(x) ≤ 8
√
2
∫ ∞
0
√
lnN() d . (27)
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We directly get from Theorem 4
ϕr ≤ 8
√
2
∫ ∞
0
√
lnNr() d , (28)
where Nr() is the minimum number of balls of dˆ with radius  that can cover B1r . Let N() be the
minimum number of balls of the Euclidean distance with radius  that can cover the unit `1 ball. From
Lemma 1 and (8) we get that
dˆ(x, y) ≤M C ‖x− y‖2 (29)
for any x, y ∈ Rn, therefore
Nr() ≤ N
(

M C r
)
(30)
and (28) implies
ϕr ≤ 8
√
2M C r
∫ ∞
0
√
lnN() d . (31)
We get from Theorem 6∫ ∞
0
√
lnN() d ≤
∫ 1√
n
0
√
n ln
(
1 +
2

)
d+
√
ln 2n
∫ 1
1√
n
d

=
√
ln 4n
2
∫ 1
0
√
ln
(
1
2
√
n
+
1
x
)
dx+
lnn
2
√
ln 2n
≤
√
ln 4n
2
∫ 1
0
√
ln
(
1
2
√
2
+
1
x
)
dx+
lnn
2
√
ln 2n
≤ 3
4
√
ln 4n+
lnn
2
√
ln 2n = an , (32)
where in the second line we made the change of variable x = 
√
n. Putting together (32), (31), (26),
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 we get
pr ≤
16√
pi
an + 1√
K(x0,x0)
M C r − 1
, (33)
and the claim follows from (8).
A.2 Random direction
Let
pr = P {∃x ∈ Lr : φ(x) = 0} . (34)
We define for any 0 ≤ t ≤ r
f(t) =
φ(x0 + t v)√
K(x0 + t v, x0 + t v)
, (35)
such that f is a centered Gaussian process on [0, r] with covariance and feature map
K˜(s, t) =
K(x0 + s v, x0 + t v)√
K(x0 + s v, x0 + s v)K(x0 + t v, x0 + t v)
, Φ˜(t) =
Φ(x0 + t v)
‖Φ(x0 + t v)‖ . (36)
We have∥∥∥Φ˜(s)− Φ˜(t)∥∥∥ = ‖‖Φ(x0 + t v)‖Φ(x0 + s v)− ‖Φ(x0 + s v)‖Φ(x0 + t v)‖‖Φ(x0 + s v)‖ ‖Φ(x0 + t v)‖
≤ ‖Φ(x0 + s v)− Φ(x0 + t v)‖+ |‖Φ(x0 + s v)‖ − ‖Φ(x0 + t v)‖|‖Φ(x0 + s v)‖
≤ 2M |s− t|‖x0 + s v‖2
≤ 2M |s− t|‖x0‖2 − r
, (37)
therefore Theorem 7 and Lemma 5 imply
pr ≤ E |{0 ≤ t ≤ r : φ(x0 + t v) = 0}| ≤ 2M r
pi (‖x0‖2 − r)
, (38)
and the claim follows.
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B Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on the following theorem, which formalizes the equivalence between
deep neural networks with random weights and biases and Gaussian processes.
Theorem 5 (Master Theorem [37]). Let φ(1), . . . , φ(L+1) be the outputs of the layers of the random
deep neural network defined in section 2. Let K(1), . . . , K(L+1) be the kernels on Rn
(0)
C ×I(0) where
K(l) is recursively defined as
E
(
φ
(l)
i,α(x)φ
(l)
j,β(y)
)
= δij K
(l)
α,β(x, y) , i, j = 1, . . . , n
(l)
C , α, β ∈ I(l) , (39)
i.e., as the covariance of φ(l), where the expectation is computed assuming that φ(1), . . . , φ(l−1) are
independent centered Gaussian processes with covariances K(1), . . . , K(l−1).
Given M ∈ N, let ψ : RM → R be such that there exist A, a,  > 0 such that for any z ∈ RM ,
|ψ(z)| ≤ exp
(
A ‖z‖2−2 + a
)
. (40)
Then, in the limit n(1)C , . . . , n
(L+1)
C →∞, we have for any x1, . . . , xM ∈ Rn
(0)
C ×I(0)
1
n
(L+1)
C
n
(L+1)
C∑
i=1
ψ
(
φ
(L+1)
i
(
x1
)
, . . . , φ
(L+1)
i
(
xM
)) a.s.−→ EZ∼N (0,Σ) ψ(Z) , (41)
with the covariance matrix Σ given by
Σmm′ = K
(L+1)
(
xm, xm
′)
, m, m′ = 1, . . . , M . (42)
Remark 5. For finite width, the outputs of the intermediate layers of the random deep neural networks
have a sub-Weibull distribution [70].
The main consequence of Theorem 5 is that the final output φ is a centered Gaussian process:
Corollary 2. The final output of the deep neural network φ is a centered Gaussian process with
covariance K = K(L+1).
Proof. Given M ∈ N, let ψ : RM → R be continuous and bounded. For any x1, . . . , xM ∈
Rn
(0)
C ×I(0) we have from Theorem 5 in the limit n(1)C , . . . , n
(L+1)
C →∞
1
n
(L+1)
C
n
(L+1)
C∑
i=1
ψ
(
φ
(L+1)
i
(
x1
)
, . . . , φ
(L+1)
i
(
xM
)) a.s.−→ EZ∼N (0,Σ) ψ(Z) , (43)
with Σ as in (42). Taking the expectation value on both sides of (43) we get, recalling that each
φ
(L+1)
i has the same probability distribution as φ,
lim
n
(1)
C , ..., n
(L)
C →∞
Eψ
(
φ
(
x1
)
, . . . , φ
(
xM
))
= EZ∼N (0,Σ) ψ(Z) , (44)
and the claim follows.
It is convenient to define for any l = 1, . . . , L
K(l)(x, y) =
∑
α∈I(l)
K(l)α,α(x, y) . (45)
Let also
d(l)(x, y)
2
= K(l)(x, x)− 2K(l)(x, y) +K(l)(y, y) (46)
be the RKHS distance associated with K(l).
We will prove by induction that for any l = 1, . . . , L+ 1 there exist C(l), M (l) > 0 such that K(l)
satisfies (8) with C = C(l) and M = M (l). The following subsections will prove the inductive step
for each of the types of layer defined in section 2.
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B.1 Input layer
φ(1)(x) is a centered Gaussian process with covariance as in (39) with
K
(1)
α,β(x, y) = σ
(1)
b
2
+ σ
(1)
W
2
n
(0)
C∑
i=1
∑
γ∈P(1)
xi,α+γ yi,β+γ
n
(0)
C
, x, y ∈ Rn(0)C ×I(0) , α, β ∈ I(1) ,
(47)
and
K(1)(x, y) =
∣∣∣I(1)∣∣∣σ(1)b 2 +
∣∣P(1)∣∣σ(1)W 2
n
(0)
C
x · y , (48)
therefore
d(1)(x, y)
2
=
∣∣P(1)∣∣σ(1)W 2
n
(0)
C
‖x− y‖22 ,
K(1)(x, x) =
∣∣∣I(1)∣∣∣σ(1)b 2 +
∣∣P(1)∣∣σ(1)W 2
n
(0)
C
‖x‖22 ≥
∣∣P(1)∣∣σ(1)W 2
n
(0)
C
‖x‖22 , (49)
and K(1) satisfies (8) with
C(1) = σ
(1)
W
√√√√∣∣P(1)∣∣
n
(0)
C
, M (1) =
√∣∣I(0)∣∣∣∣I(1)∣∣ = 1 . (50)
B.2 Nonlinear layer
Let the (l+ 1)-th layer be a nonlinear layer. From Theorem 5, we can assume that φ(l) is the centered
Gaussian process with covariance K(l). We then have
K
(l+1)
α,β (x, y) = σ
(l+1)
b
2
+ σ
(l+1)
W
2 ∑
γ∈P(l+1)
E
(
τ(u) τ(v) : (u, v) ∼ N
(
0,Σ
(l)
α,β(x, y)
))
, (51)
with
Σ
(l)
α,β(x, y) =
(
K
(l)
α+γ,α+γ(x, x) K
(l)
α+γ,β+γ(x, y)
K
(l)
β+γ,α+γ(y, x) K
(l)
β+γ,β+γ(y, y)
)
. (52)
If τ is the ReLU activation function, (51) simplifies to
K
(l+1)
α,β (x, y) = σ
(l+1)
b
2
+
σ
(l+1)
W
2
2
∑
γ∈P(l+1)
V
(l)
α+γ,β+γ(x, y) , (53)
where
V
(l)
α,β(x, y) =
√
K
(l)
α,α(x, x)K
(l)
β,β(y, y) Ψ
 K(l)α,β(x, y)√
K
(l)
α,α(x, x)K
(l)
β,β(y, y)
 , (54)
with Ψ : [−1, 1]→ R given by
Ψ(t) =
√
1− t2 + (pi − arccos t) t
pi
. (55)
Remark 6. Since Ψ(t) ≥ 0 for any −1 ≤ t ≤ 1, we have from (54) and (53) that K(l+1)α,β (x, y) ≥ 0
for any x, y ∈ Rn(0) × I(0) and any α, β ∈ I(l+1) = I(l).
Let
V (l)(x, y) =
∑
α∈I
V (l)α,α(x, y) . (56)
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Since Ψ(1) = 1, we get
V (l)(x, x) = K(l)(x, x) . (57)
Since Ψ(t) ≥ t for any −1 ≤ t ≤ 1, we also get
V (l)(x, y) ≥ K(l)(x, y) . (58)
Moreover,
K(l+1)(x, y) =
∣∣∣I(l+1)∣∣∣σ(l+1)b 2 +
∣∣P(l+1)∣∣σ(l+1)W 2
2
V (l)(x, y)
≥
∣∣∣I(l+1)∣∣∣σ(l+1)b 2 +
∣∣P(l+1)∣∣σ(l+1)W 2
2
K(l)(x, y) , (59)
with equality for y = x. We then have
K(l+1)(x, x) ≥
∣∣P(l+1)∣∣σ(l+1)W 2
2
K(l)(x, x) ≥
∣∣P(l+1)∣∣σ(l+1)W 2 C(l)2
2
‖x‖22 , (60)
where we have used the inductive hypothesis. Moreover,
d(l+1)(x, y)
2 ≤
∣∣P(l+1)∣∣σ(l+1)W 2
2
d(l)(x, y)
2 ≤
∣∣P(l+1)∣∣σ(l+1)W 2 ∣∣I(0)∣∣C(l)2
2
∣∣I(l)∣∣ ‖x− y‖22 , (61)
where we have used the inductive hypothesis again, and K(l+1) satisfies (8) with
C(l+1) = σ
(l+1)
W
√∣∣P(l+1)∣∣
2
C(l) , M (l+1) =
√∣∣I(0)∣∣∣∣I(l)∣∣ =
√ ∣∣I(0)∣∣∣∣I(l+1)∣∣ . (62)
B.3 Skipped connection
Let the (l + 1)-th layer be a skipped connection. We have
K
(l+1)
α,β (x, y) = K
(l)
α,β(x, y) +K
(l−k)
α,β (x, y) , (63)
and
K(l+1)(x, y) = K(l)(x, y) +K(l−k)(x, y) . (64)
Since in section 2 we have imposed k ≤ l − 2, we have from Remark 6 K(l+1)α,β (x, y) ≥ 0 for any
x, y ∈ Rn(0) × I(0) and any α, β ∈ I(l+1). We then have
K(l+1)(x, x) = K(l)(x, x) +K(l−k)(x, x) ≥
(
C(l)
2
+ C(l−k)
2
)
‖x‖22 , (65)
where we have used the inductive hypothesis. Moreover,
d(l+1)(x, y)
2
= d(l)(x, y)
2
+ d(l−k)(x, y)
2 ≤
∣∣I(0)∣∣∣∣I(l)∣∣ (C(l)2 + C(l−k)2) ‖x− y‖22 , (66)
where we have used the inductive hypothesis again, and K(l+1) satisfies (8) with
C(l+1) =
√
C(l)
2
+ C(l−k)2 , M (l+1) =
√∣∣I(0)∣∣∣∣I(l)∣∣ =
√ ∣∣I(0)∣∣∣∣I(l+1)∣∣ . (67)
B.4 Pooling
Let the (l + 1)-th layer be a pooling layer. Since in the architecture defined in section 2 we have
imposed the l-th layer to be a nonlinear convolutional layer, from Remark 6 we have K(l)β,γ(x, x) ≥ 0
for any β, γ ∈ I(l). We can assume from Theorem 5 that φ(l) is a Gaussian process with covariance
K(l). We then have
K
(l+1)
α,β (x, y) =
∑
γ∈α, δ∈β
K
(l)
γ,δ(x, y) , α, β ∈ I(l+1) , (68)
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and
K(l+1)(x, y) =
∑
α∈I(l+1)
∑
β, γ∈α
K
(l)
β,γ(x, y) . (69)
We have from the inductive hypothesis
d(l+1)(x, y)
2 ≤
∣∣I(l)∣∣∣∣I(l+1)∣∣d(l)(x, y)2 ≤
∣∣I(0)∣∣∣∣I(l+1)∣∣C(l)2 ‖x− y‖22 . (70)
Moreover, since K(l)β,γ(x, x) ≥ 0, we have
K(l+1)(x, x) ≥
∑
α∈I(l+1)
∑
β∈α
K
(l)
β,β(x, x) = K
(l)(x, x) ≥ C(l)2 ‖x‖22 , (71)
where we have used the inductive hypothesis again, and K(l+1) satisfies (8) with
C(l+1) = C(l) , M (l+1) =
√ ∣∣I(0)∣∣∣∣I(l+1)∣∣ . (72)
B.5 Flattening
From Theorem 5, we can assume that φ(L) is the centered Gaussian process with covariance K(L).
The proof is completely analog to the proof in subsection B.2, and K(L+1) satisfies (8) with
C = C(L+1) = σ
(L+1)
W
√∣∣I(Lf )∣∣
2
C(L) , M = M (L+1) =
√ ∣∣I(0)∣∣∣∣I(Lf )∣∣ . (73)
C Lemmas
Lemma 1. dˆ(x, y) ≤ d(x, y) for any x, y ∈ Rn.
Proof. Since Kˆ ≤ K we have
d(x, y)
2
=
(
1
−1
)(
K(x, x) K(x, y)
K(y, x) K(y, y)
)
( 1 −1 )
≥
(
1
−1
)(
Kˆ(x, x) Kˆ(x, y)
Kˆ(y, x) Kˆ(y, y)
)
( 1 −1 ) = dˆ(x, y)2 . (74)
Lemma 2. For any x, y ∈ B1r we have
d(x, y)
2 ≤ F ′(1) (x− y)2 . (75)
Proof. We have
d(x, y)
2 ≤ 2− 2K(x, y) = 2− 2F (x · y) ≤ 2F ′(1) (1− x · y) = F ′(1) (x− y)2 , (76)
where we have used that F is convex and that F (1) = 1.
Theorem 6. For any  > 0, the open unit ball B1 of the `1 norm in Rn can be covered with
N() ≤

1  ≥ 1
(2n)
1
2 1√
n
<  < 1(
1 + 2
)n
0 <  ≤ 1√
n
(77)
balls of the Euclidean distance with radius  and centers in B1.
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Proof. The upper bound for 0 <  ≤ 1√
n
has been proven in [65]. Let 1√
n
<  < 1, and let m ∈ N
be such that
2 ≤ m ≤ n , 1
m
≤ 2 < 1
m− 1 . (78)
We consider the lattice
Lm = Z
n
m
∩ B1 . (79)
For any x ∈ B1, there exists y ∈ Lm such that for any i = 1, . . . , n
|xi − yi| ≤ min
(
1
m
, |xi|
)
. (80)
We have
(x− y)2 ≤ 1
m2
∣∣∣∣{i : |xi| > 1m
}∣∣∣∣+ ∑
i : |xi|≤ 1m
|xi|2 ≤ 1
m
∑
i:|xi|> 1m
|xi|+ 1
m
∑
i : |xi|≤ 1m
|xi| = ‖x‖1
m
≤ 1
m
≤ 2 , (81)
therefore N() ≤ |Lm|. The claim follows since
|Lm| =
m−1∑
k=0
2k
(
n
k
)(
m− 1
k
)
≤ (2n)m−1 ≤ (2n) 12 . (82)
Lemma 3. We have
Kr ≥ 1− M C r√
K(x0, x0)
. (83)
Proof. We have for any x ∈ B1r
|K(x, x0)−K(x0, x0)| = |(Φ(x)− Φ(x0)) · Φ(x0)| ≤ ‖Φ(x)− Φ(x0)‖ ‖Φ(x0)‖
≤M C ‖x− x0‖2
√
K(x0, x0) ≤M C r
√
K(x0, x0) , (84)
where we have used (8) and that ‖x− x0‖2 ≤ r, and the claim follows.
Lemma 4. We have
σr ≤M C r . (85)
Proof. We have for any x ∈ B1r
Kˆ(x, x) = ‖Φ(x)− Φ(x0)‖2 − (K(x0, x0)−K(x, x0))
2
K(x0, x0)
≤M2 C2 ‖x− x0‖2 ≤M2 C2 r2 ,
(86)
where we have used (8).
Theorem 7 (Rice’s formula [68]). Let f : [0, r]→ R be a centered Gaussian process with covariance
K˜ such that K˜(t, t) = 1 for any 0 ≤ t ≤ r. Then,
E |{0 ≤ t ≤ r : f(t) = 0}| = 1
pi
∫ r
0
√
∂2
∂s∂t
K˜(s, t)
∣∣∣∣
s=t
dt . (87)
Lemma 5. Let d˜ be the distance associated with K˜, and let us assume that for any s, t ∈ [0, r]
d˜(s, t) ≤ C˜ |s− t| . (88)
Then,
∂2
∂s∂t
K˜(s, t)
∣∣∣∣
s=t
≤ C˜2 . (89)
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Proof. Let Φ˜ be the feature map associated with K˜. We have
∂2
∂s∂t
K˜(s, t)
∣∣∣∣
s=t
= lim
→0
(
Φ˜(s+ )− Φ˜(s)
)
·
(
Φ˜(t+ )− Φ˜(t)
)
2
≤ lim
→0
∥∥∥Φ˜(s+ )− Φ˜(s)∥∥∥∥∥∥Φ˜(t+ )− Φ˜(t)∥∥∥
2
≤ C˜2 . (90)
D Experimental Details
D.1 Adversarial Attack Methods
To find adversarial examples, various different adversarial attack methods were used. The list of
adversarial attack used for each norm are given in Table 1. Hyperparameters for adversarial attack
algorithms were also varied to find adversarial examples at the smallest norm possible. All attacks
were performed using the python package Foolbox [71].
For adversarial attacks on random neural networks (section 4), attacks were performed on random
inputs where each input was sampled from the uniform distribution bounded by [0, 1]. For random
neural networks, weights were chosen randomly according to a normal distribution with variance
scaled depending on the number of neurons in prior and posterior layers [72]. For each random neural
network constructed, attacks were performed on batches of 10 randomized inputs. To be consistent
with attacks in the adversarial literature, neural networks were constructed with two output neurons
to perform binary classification. No activation (e.g., softmax) was included in the final layer and
attacks were directly performed on output logits.
Inputs were bounded by [0, 1] in every dimension or pixel. Thus, attack algorithms were restricted in
their operation within these bounds. In the case of random inputs, inputs were adversarially attacked
to change their binary classification. In the cases where train or test data was provided (i.e., in
the cases of MNIST and CIFAR10), inputs were adversarially attacked to change the classification
provided by the network (not necessarily the correct classification).
Adversarial Attack Methods
`1 Norm Attacks EAD Attack [73]
Pointwise Attack [74]
Saliency Map Attack [75]
Sparse L1 Basic Iterative Method [76]
`2 Norm Attacks Basic Iterative Method [7]
Carlini Wagner Attack [77]
Decoupled Direction Norm Attack [78]
`∞ Norm Attacks Basic Iterative Method [7]
Momentum Iterative Method [79]
Adam Projected Gradient Descent [77, 80]
Table 1: List of attack algorithms used to find the closest adversarial example for each norm. Attack
algorithms were performed with varying hyperparameters. Among the adversarial examples given by
the various attacks, the adversarial example with the smallest distance norm from the starting point is
assumed to be the closest adversarial example.
D.2 Network Architectures
Various different networks were empirically studied. Layer sequences for the various networks are
provided in Table 2. Weights in all networks were initialized randomly with variance inversely
proportional to the size of the previous layer, often termed He initialization [81]. In all cases, to
conform to the standards provided in the Foolbox toolbox [71], output layers contained two neurons,
one for each class in the binary classification task. In all cases, the nonlinear activation used was the
rectified linear unit (ReLU).
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Inputs to all the networks are assumed to be 2-dimensional images with 3 channels. The only
exception to this case is for networks trained on MNIST data where inputs have only one channel.
Simplified Residual Network “LeNet” Style [82]
Network
Fully Connected
Network
Simple Convolutional
Network
Residual Block*
(32 channels)
3x3 Conv - ReLU
(128 Channels)
Flatten 3x3 Conv - ReLU
(128 Channels)
Residual Block**
(64 channels)
3x3 Conv - ReLU
(128 Channels)
Fully Connected - ReLU
(100 Neurons)
3x3 Conv - ReLU
(128 Channels)
Residual Block**
(128 channels)
2x2 Average Pooling
Fully Connected - ReLU
(100 Neurons)
3x3 Conv - ReLU
(128 Channels)
Flatten 3x3 Conv - ReLU
(128 Channels)
Output Layer 3x3 Conv - ReLU
(128 Channels)
Output Layer 3x3 Conv - ReLU
(128 Channels)
Flatten
2x2 Average Pooling Output Layer
Flatten
Fully Connected - ReLU
(512 Neurons)
Fully Connected - ReLU
(512 Neurons)
Output Layer
* residual blocks contain 2 3x3 convolutional layers each followed by ReLU activation
** first convolution layer in residual block has stride set to 2 (feature map size is halved)
Table 2: Layer sequences for the various networks empirically studied. Layer sequences should be
read from top to bottom.
D.3 Trained Networks
For analysis on trained networks (subsection 4.1), networks were trained on either MNIST or
CIFAR10 data under the task of binary classification. A softmax activation was placed on the two
neurons of the last layer of all networks. For the case of MNIST, the binary classification task
was determining if a digit is odd or even. For CIFAR10, image classes were assigned to binary
categories of either {airplane, bird, deer, frog, ship} or {automobile, cat, dog, horse, truck}. All
networks were trained to minimize categorical cross-entropy using the Adam optimizer [83]. Batch
normalization was not included in any networks and none of the networks used dropout [84]. For
CIFAR10 data, networks were trained for 25 epochs on the complete training set with a learning rate
of 0.0001. For MNIST data, networks were trained for 15 epochs on the complete training set with a
learning rate of 0.0001. For the simplified residual network, trained networks achieved an average
binary classification accuracy of 99.8% and 99.4% on the MNIST training and test sets respectively.
Furthermore, the same network architecture trained on CIFAR10 achieved an average of 98.8% and
82.5% accuracy on training and test sets.
Adversarial attacks were performed on batches of 20 random images or 20 randomly chosen images
from the training or test sets. Median adversarial distances in Figure 3 were taken from a sample size
of 5000 points – 250 trained networks each attacking 20 random images.
E Supplementary Figures
Adversarial attacks on random networks were performed on various architectures. In this section, we
include figures for attacks performed on networks not included in the main text.
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Figure 5: Random untrained networks: Median distance of closest adversarial examples ‖∆x‖p
from their respective inputs (p ∈ {1, 2, ∞}) scale as predicted in Remark 3 for a “LeNet” [82]
architecture (see subsection D.2 for full description of network). Error bars span from the 45th
percentile to the 55th percentile of adversarial distances. For each input dimension, results are
calculated from 2000 samples (200 random networks each attacked at 10 random points). See
Appendix D for further details on how experiments were performed.
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Figure 6: Random untrained networks: Median relative distance of closest adversarial examples
‖∆x‖p/‖x0‖p from their respective inputs (p ∈ {1, 2, ∞}) scale with the input dimension n as
O(1/
√
n) in all norms for a “LeNet” [82] architecture (see subsection D.2 for full description of
network). Error bars span from the 45th percentile to the 55th percentile of adversarial distances. For
each input dimension, results are calculated from 2000 samples (200 random networks each attacked
at 10 random points).
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Figure 7: Random untrained networks: Median distance of closest adversarial examples ‖∆x‖p
from their respective inputs (p ∈ {1, 2, ∞}) scale as predicted in Remark 3 for a fully connected
network (see subsection D.2 for full description of network). Error bars span from the 45th percentile
to the 55th percentile of adversarial distances. For each input dimension, results are calculated from
2000 samples (200 random networks each attacked at 10 random points). See Appendix D for further
details on how experiments were performed.
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Figure 8: Random untrained networks: Median relative distance of closest adversarial examples
‖∆x‖p/‖x0‖p from their respective inputs (p ∈ {1, 2, ∞}) scale with the input dimension n as
O(1/
√
n) in all norms for a fully connected network (see subsection D.2 for full description of
network). Error bars span from the 45th percentile to the 55th percentile of adversarial distances. For
each input dimension, results are calculated from 2000 samples (200 random networks each attacked
at 10 random points).
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Figure 9: Random untrained networks: Median distance of closest adversarial examples ‖∆x‖p
from their respective inputs (p ∈ {1, 2, ∞}) scale as predicted in Remark 3 for a simple convolutional
network (see subsection D.2 for full description of network). Error bars span from the 45th percentile
to the 55th percentile of adversarial distances. For each input dimension, results are calculated from
2000 samples (200 random networks each attacked at 10 random points). See Appendix D for further
details on how experiments were performed.
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Figure 10: Random untrained networks: Median relative distance of closest adversarial examples
‖∆x‖p/‖x0‖p from their respective inputs (p ∈ {1, 2, ∞}) scale with the input dimension n as
O(1/
√
n) in all norms for a simple convolutional network (see subsection D.2 for full description of
network). Error bars span from the 45th percentile to the 55th percentile of adversarial distances. For
each input dimension, results are calculated from 2000 samples (200 random networks each attacked
at 10 random points).
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